


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# **Joint Task Force SUPPORT HOPE Lessons for Power Projection**

A Monograph  
By  
Lieutenant Colonel Robert J. Reese  
Field Artillery



School of Advanced Military Studies  
United States Army Command and General Staff College  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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
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
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## ABSTRACT

JOINT TASK FORCE SUPPORT HOPE LESSONS FOR POWER PROJECTION by  
LTC Robert J. Reese, USA, 52 pages.

This monograph examines Joint Task Force (JTF) SUPPORT HOPE operations to determine if aspects of this crisis response apply to all U.S. power projection operations. It provides an overview of the crisis and JTF support of U.N. and NGO relief agencies. The monograph considers military mission analysis and activation of the JTF headquarters.

At the end of this study I concluded that the JCS should reevaluate procedural methods for decentralized control of military operations. Crisis action planning procedures must allow National Command Authorities to articulate intent and provide the CINC and his staff the means to present their concept in a rapidly unfolding crisis. Analysis of SUPPORT HOPE also identified the JTF staff's requirement for politico-military experience. This operation demonstrated that conditions may force the staff to deploy with little preparation and deprive the commander of critical advice in this area. Examination of SUPPORT HOPE also underscored the importance of the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. The framers' intent envisions "joint" JTFs instead of those created from component pieces with limited augmentation from the unified command. The spirit of Goldwater-Nichols may also require the military to organize joint commands below unified command level on an extended basis to ensure that JTFs can perform as well as the legislators expected.

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## INTRODUCTION

The U.S. European Command deployed Joint Task Force (JTF) SUPPORT HOPE to aid Rwandan relief efforts in mid-1994 in an operation that may contain important lessons for all combatant commands. SUPPORT HOPE offers insights into civil-military and inter-agency operations, military interaction with the news media, and relationships between peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations. SUPPORT HOPE also illuminates problems associated with the employment of military units without status of forces agreements, the development of effective rules of engagement, and the effectiveness of military intelligence systems in non-combat operations. Additionally, the JTF Commander demonstrated how to complete a humanitarian assistance mission, transfer long-term tasks to non-governmental agencies, and redeploy forces in less than 90 days. These issues are extremely important to the U.S. military as it accepts an increasing number of non-combat missions. However, they may not represent the most important lessons available from this operation.

The potential value of SUPPORT HOPE lessons increases when one considers the U.S. power projection strategy, joint military doctrine, and conditions common to all international emergencies. This value results from similarities among joint operations. The causes of this symmetry include the urgency of crises that move U.S. National Command Authorities (NCA), frequent requirements to project power into undeveloped theaters, and continual requirements to conduct operations for which no contingency plans exist. SUPPORT HOPE contained these and other characteristics common to U.S. models for the projection of armed forces for combat and non-combat missions. It required deployment of forces over 6,000 kilometers from home station, joint and multi-agency operations, immediate commitment of forward presence forces, and logistics across undeveloped lines of communication (LOCs).<sup>1</sup> This paper examines the U.S. military's re-

sponse to the Rwandan refugee crisis to develop insights into planning and executing power projection operations.

The U.N. and other relief agencies were overwhelmed by the magnitude of the Rwandan refugee movement into neighboring nations in July 1994. The long standing struggle between Rwandan Hutu and Tutsi erupted into uncontrolled violence following the death of the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi on April 6th. Hutu militias and selected military units massacred hundreds of thousands of ethnic Tutsi as conflict resumed between the two groups. Although outnumbered, Tutsi rebels managed to defeat Rwandan Army units and triggered an unprecedented exodus into surrounding nations.<sup>2</sup> Refugee movement out of northern Rwanda onto Goma, Zaire created a humanitarian disaster. The scope of the disaster overpowered the U.N. and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as they attempted to assist refugees and displaced persons. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) requested assistance when it became clear that the U.N. and NGOs were incapable of handling the crisis.

President Clinton announced Operation SUPPORT HOPE and a new U.S. approach to the crisis at a press conference on July 22d, 1994. He pledged to continue U.S. relief efforts, provide additional funds, and provide military assistance to U.N. and NGOs.<sup>3</sup> The U.S. military initiated humanitarian support of Rwandan relief efforts in May 1994, flying over 100 aircraft missions of relief supplies by July 22d. The President continued this support and provided additional dollars for Rwandan refugee relief. However, the President signaled a significant increase in U.S. commitment with his announcement that the U.S. would deploy military forces to the refugee crisis area (RCA).

The NCA tasked the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) to organize the military's support for the U.N. and other agencies. Located in Stuttgart, Germany, USEUCOM coordinates and directs all U.S. military operations conducted in Western Europe,



the Balkans, Turkey, portions of the Middle East, and most of Africa.<sup>4</sup> The European Command created JTF SUPPORT HOPE in response to this tasking. The JTF controlled forces committed to the relief effort and managed all U.S. military activities in support of Rwandan refugee relief efforts.

Joint Task Force SUPPORT HOPE organized itself in a matter of days and provided critical support to the UNHCR. The JTF headquarters assembled in Stuttgart, deployed to Africa, and took operational control of selected U.S. Army, Air Force, and Special Operations Force units required to assist the UNHCR. The U.N. asked for assistance in providing clean water to the refugees, operating two key airfields, and managing an airhead in the region.<sup>5</sup> The JTF deployed to Uganda, Zaire, Rwanda, and other nearby countries, along with supporting USTRANSCOM elements, to assist the relief efforts. United States military forces purified water and distributed it to refugee camps near Goma in Zaire, helped UNHCR and French authorities operate the Goma Airfield, established an intermediate staging base at the Entebbe Airport in Uganda, opened the airport in the Rwandan capital of Kigali, and helped the UNHCR establish and manage a logistics coordination center.<sup>6</sup>

The JTF completed its mission in 76 days and redeployed to Europe where it stood down in early October. Its servicemen and women accomplished a great deal to stop the dying and relieve the suffering of Rwandan refugees. Their efforts led to the production and distribution of over 4 million liters of potable water per day in the Goma area where little clean water existed for refugees on July 22d. They increased the flow of supplies through the critical Goma Airfield and facilitated a rapid expansion of U.N. and non-governmental agency operations in Kigali. Military forces also transported thousands of tons of critical supplies into and throughout the refugee crisis area and led efforts to transition supply operations from air delivery to a more practical truck transport system.<sup>7</sup>

The European Command disbanded the JTF on October 7th amid reports and articles attesting to the success of the operation.

This paper examines the development of the JTF mission and the activation of the JTF to answer the question: Do aspects of SUPPORT HOPE apply to all U.S. power projection operations? Simple criteria determine the relevance of Operation SUPPORT HOPE lessons with respect to this study. First, the insights must transcend this type of operation to apply to all power projection operations. Second, the lessons must pertain to other combatant commands besides USEUCOM. Third, they must be unclassified and accessible to a wide range of agencies. Last, the observations must be original or reflect issues identified earlier that continue to hinder power projection operations.

This paper explores the research question by reviewing the conduct of the operation and by identifying lessons suitable to combatant commands and joint task forces worldwide. The second section provides a general overview of the crisis and JTF support of U.N. and NGO relief agencies. The third section examines the mission analysis conducted by USEUCOM and the JTF to identify how the commands interpreted their mission. This section also looks for discontinuities between Washington and European views of the mission. The fourth section examines the formation of the JTF headquarters, focusing on the organization's creation and evolution. The last section summarizes the examination of the operation, provides an assessment of the research question, and considers the relevance for future operations.

## **OVERVIEW**

### **Background**

The roots of the recent Rwandan disaster extend deep into the history of the country and the region. European historians once contended that the Tutsi migrated into what is

now Rwanda and Burundi over 500 years ago and established control over the more numerous agrarian Hutu and a small number of pygmies known as Twa. Today, some anthropologist and sociologists consider migration theories racist. They argue that distinctions between the Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa result merely from class distinctions. Regardless of which theory is correct, the Tutsi dominated the Hutu and Twa for many years because they possessed cattle and a greater knowledge of warfare.<sup>8</sup> The Tutsi minority used their power to create a monarchy and caste system between the 16th and 19th centuries that survived until the middle of this century.

European influences helped shape the relationship between Tutsi and Hutu. Germany absorbed the region into German East Africa at the end of the 19th century and maintained control of the area until replaced by Belgium at the end of World War I. Both nations exercised indirect rule in Rwanda and Burundi because of the region's isolation and the sophistication of the existing governments. This reliance on existing organizations and leaders continued Tutsi rule. The Belgians did not attempt to change the existing structure until the late 1950s, when their modernization of the educational, political, legal, and administrative systems strengthened the Hutu majority. Hutu dominated the government when Rwanda received its independence in 1962.<sup>9</sup>

The Tutsi further strengthened Hutu dominance by refusing to accept their rule. Tutsi terrorist attacks in the 1960s led to Hutu massacre of Tutsi, repression, and Tutsi refugee movements into Uganda and other neighboring countries. In 1973, regional instability allowed Juvenal Habyarimana, the Rwandan Army Chief of Staff, to seize power. Habyarimana, a hard line Hutu from one of the northern prefectures, established tight control over the government and maintained relative stability until the autumn of 1990.<sup>10</sup>

Conflict between Hutu backing Habyarimana and Tutsi intensified between 1990 and 1994. The Tutsi-controlled Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) exploited economic and social conditions and invaded Rwanda from Uganda with a military force numbering over 5,000 on October 1st, 1990. The Habyarimana government countered the threat initially, but could not eliminate the RPF or force it to return to Uganda. Fighting throughout 1991 and 1992 left the RPF in position to threaten Habyarimana's rule. Additional RPF successes in 1993 forced Habyarimana to the negotiating table and produced agreements, which outlined a restructuring of his government. Hutu hard liners from the northern prefectures opposed the agreements designed to loosen their hold on the government. At the same time, armed militias developed significant power and received encouragement from political leaders calling for Tutsi killings.<sup>11</sup>

The death of President Habyarimana in April 1994 provided a catalyst for unprecedented violence. Habyarimana and Cyprien Ntaryamira, the President of Burundi, died when a rocket struck their airplane as they returned from peace talks in Tanzania on April 6th. Hutu hard liners reacted to the event by killing members of a Tutsi military unit stationed in the capital and by eliminating moderate members of the government. They also initiated government sponsored genocide against the Tutsi, which involved militias, local leaders, and Hutu citizens throughout the country. The result was the death of between 500,000 and 1,000,000 Rwandan Tutsi and moderate Hutu.<sup>12</sup>

The RPF exploited the chaos, defeated the Rwandan military, and pushed a tidal wave of refugees ahead of them as they established control of most of Rwanda. The RPF infiltrated into the capital in mid-April as an interim government, organized by the former Speaker of the Parliament, fled the city. By late May, the RPF controlled the Kigali Airport and the northern and eastern portions of the country. They commanded the entire capital city by early July. During the first half of July, they pushed displaced Hutu to


the southwest where the French had established a "safe zone" and to the northwest towards Goma, Zaire. Extraordinary numbers of refugees moved into the protected area and into eastern Zaire ahead of the advancing RPF. Relief agencies estimated that over a million refugees occupied the Goma area by July 15th. The UNHCR requested international support for the relief effort on July 19th as refugee numbers and support requirements exceeded U.N. and NGO capabilities.<sup>13</sup>

### **Military Mission**

President Clinton announced his intention to expand U.S. support of the international refugee relief effort on July 22d. He directed U.S. support along two paths. First, he promised \$40.1 million in new assistance. This brought the U.S. commitment to \$150 million for refugee relief in the region. Second, he stated that the U.S. would place soldiers on the ground in the refugee crisis area (RCA). The U.S. would assist the UNHCR by establishing an airlift hub, expanding operations at two airfields near refugee centers, and distributing clean water. The President also announced that he would dispatch a JTF commanded by Brigadier General J. P. Nix to organize U.S. military efforts and provide support on the ground.<sup>14</sup>

The U.S. European Command and supporting agencies responded quickly to provide the UNHCR critical support that was unavailable from other sources. The USEUCOM staff initiated crisis action planning and the U.S. Transportation Command landed a Tanker Airlift Control Element (TALCE) in Nairobi, Kenya before the President's speech on the 22d. The Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) air-dropped food to refugees in the Goma area on July 24th and U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) soldiers began purifying water in the same area on the 26th. General Nix also arrived in the RCA the 26th, where he conducted an immediate assessment and began shaping the JTF deployment.<sup>15</sup>

## JTF ORGANIZATION



control of a helicopter task force from an amphibious ready group at sea to the JTF to augment security. The U.S. Transportation Command dispatched ships stationed at Diego Garcia carrying Army war reserve equipment. Additionally, the U.S. Atlantic Command deployed an Army transportation battalion to Mombasa, Kenya to manage the flow of supplies between sea LOCs and intra-theater air and ground LOCs. The transportation battalion also prepared to unload the war reserve equipment prepositioned aboard the ships from Diego Garcia.<sup>17</sup>

### **Other JTF Results**

Commitment of the U.S. military also provided an important catalyst for international relief efforts. In addition to providing water and other services directed by the NCA, the U.S. military stimulated relief efforts in at least four areas. First, the President demonstrated a major change in U.S. policy with his assignment of military units and personnel to the relief effort. This act signaled the near-term availability of airlift and U.S. military presence in the region. Second, the opening of Kigali Airport produced an explosion in the number of relief agencies operating in and through the Rwandan capital. Between July 22d and August 17th, after JTF SUPPORT HOPE opened the airport and restored critical navigation aids, the number relief agencies operating out of Kigali increased from six to over 60.<sup>18</sup> Third, the JTF convinced UNHCR representatives of the importance of truck transportation. The UNHCR focused initially on the airlift of critical supplies into Goma and Bukavu, Zaire. Joint task force planners endorsed World Food Program (WFP) efforts to increase the number of large commercial trucks in the region, most of which hauled nearly four times as much as a C-130. The commercial truck fleet numbered approximately 240 trucks by mid-August and was expected to include over 400 trucks by mid to late September.<sup>19</sup> Fourth, the JTF helped the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) avert a second Goma-like disaster in Bukavu. The

forces of UNAMIR protected displaced civilians, provided security for humanitarian relief operations, acted as an intermediary between the warring parties, and provided medical support for refugees and displaced persons.<sup>20</sup> The withdrawal of the French in late August threatened to cause another exodus into Zaire as Hutu fled a perceived threat from the new Rwandan government. The U.S. military flew African peacekeepers and equipment to Rwanda to accelerate the growth of UNAMIR and permit its relief of the French. The U.S. military also flew trucks from Mombasa to Kigali and Entebbe to allow the WFP to accompany the UNAMIR forces with an incentive for the refugees to remain in Rwanda.<sup>21</sup>

### **Inter-Agency Cooperation**

The NCA's choice of mission provided the JTF Commander maximum flexibility concerning his concept of operations. The NCA left control of American units in the hands of the CINC and the JTF Commander and gave them the mission to support U.N. and NGO efforts. This move allowed the CINC and the JTF Commander to determine the level of effort required, the degree of support available, the organization of relief forces, and the exit strategy. This flexibility permitted them to define the end state and to redeploy forces once they achieved it.<sup>22</sup>

Friction developed between the military and the relief agencies because of organizational differences and because of an initial lack of clarity in the mission. The JTF Commander recognized the potential for misunderstanding and conflict between the two groups. Products of very different institutional cultures, the crisis forced them together under extremely stressful conditions.<sup>23</sup> The two groups approached the crisis differently. The aid workers maintained a long-term focus and were prepared to provide support as long as there were refugees outside Rwanda. Faced with other crises in Europe and around the world, military relief workers strove to complete assigned tasks as quickly as



possible and to get on to the next operation. Changes in the stated JTF mission exacerbated this institutional conflict to the point where some observers complained that the military left the RCA "...after fulfilling only some of the tasks outlined by President Bill Clinton and his top advisers..."<sup>24</sup>

The JTF improved the refugee situation in the Goma area dramatically and achieved far more than it was asked to do, but it left Africa amid questions concerning its mission. The next section provides insight into this issue by looking at what the UNHCR asked the U.S. to do and how the U.S. military interpreted the request.

### **MISSION ANALYSIS**

The first section proposed the use of this humanitarian relief mission to develop insights concerning the U.S. military's power projection doctrine. That discussion emphasized the general symmetry between this type of operation and those employing armed force (deployment of forces over 6,000 kilometers from home station, joint and multi-agency operations, immediate commitment of forward presence forces, and logistics across undeveloped LOCs). Additional similarities stand out when one examines the planning process conducted by the military in July 1994. These include: a crisis initiates the operation; there is little or no warning; rapid action is essential; contingency plans may not address required actions; a campaign plan is required that links strategy, operations, and tactics and integrates military operations with other forms of national power; the relationship between the military, the U.N., NGOs, and other nations is critical; and the political and military interaction plays a critical role in the U.S. response.

Planners may gain insights into mission analysis and planning for all joint operations by examining Joint Task Force SUPPORT HOPE's performance under these conditions. The effectiveness of decentralized control offers a perspective for analyzing the

JTF's performance. Control is the mechanism the NCA (through the CJCS) and subordinate commanders use to monitor the decision making process in lower headquarters, to gauge the status of on-going efforts, and to ensure compliance with their instructions. This section traces the U.N. request for assistance through crisis action planning and then examines decentralized NCA control. The objective is to identify factors that affected the planning process and insights that emerge from its examination.

### **Washington and the U.S. Aid Package**

Initial requests for assistance described relief agency requirements clearly. The United States military's role in the crisis evolved from two UNHCR petitions for help, one communicated through the military and the other through the Department of State (DOS). The USEUCOM liaison officer to the UNHCR's Airlift Operations Cell in Geneva relayed the first request to USEUCOM on July 17th. His report communicated two requirements. First, the UNHCR wanted the U.S. military's air operations cell in Geneva to help establish an air bridge into the refugee crisis area (RCA) similar to that operated in the former Republic of Yugoslavia. The UNHCR also used this report to issue a general plea for assistance.<sup>25</sup> The UNHCR drafted the second request for assistance two days later. It provided a detailed description of the support required in the RCA. It included eight service packages intended to augment the infrastructure and provide logistical support for the U.N. The packages addressed: airport services, logistics base services, road servicing and security, site preparation, provision of domestic fuel, sanitation facilities, water management, and management of an airhead.<sup>26</sup> The UNHCR communicated its request to many nations, but considered support from the U.S. critical to the success of the relief effort. Some members of the inter-agency planning group for this crisis did not view this request until the 20th or 21st.<sup>27</sup>

The DOS outlined the U.S. offer of assistance to the UNHCR early on July 22d. A DOS cable informed the U.S. missions to Geneva and to the U.N. in New York of the U.S. Government's willingness to provide support for four service packages. Other addressees included selected European and African embassies, the Secretary of Defense and selected offices of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. European Command, and others. The cable stated that the U.S. was "...prepared to take the lead role on two of the 'support packages' requested -- water management (number 7) and management of an Entebbe airhead (number 8)."<sup>28</sup> The U.S. would also work to provide airport and logistics base support (service packages one and two).<sup>29</sup> The cable also reported that the U.S. might provide packaged meals to augment humanitarian relief supplies. It is important to note that DOS communicated the U.S. offer in terms of the original UNHCR service packages. The original UNHCR description of the four packages included these requirements:

**No. 1 Airport Services**

- Requirements:
  - Repair and expansion of runway
  - Fencing and security
  - Off-loading and handling of cargos
  - Establishment and management of temporary storage facilities
- Self-contained with all equipment and personnel

**No. 2 Logistics Base Services**

- Requirements:
  - Establishment of service/workshop for approximately 300 trucks, 50 water tankers and 100 light vehicles
  - Provision of fuel depot and resupply of fuel for entire operation
- Self-contained with equipment, including mobile workshops and recovery vehicles, and personnel for management and servicing of the combined UNHCR/WFP fleet as well as, to extent possible, other participating agencies and NGOs.

**No. 7 Water Management**

- Requirements:
  - Organize and manage water tanker operation from water sources to sites, pending establishment of alternative ground water sources
  - Ensure water purification
  - Setup water storage and distribution systems in sites
  - Investigate ground source potential or other sources of supply to replace tanker operation
- Provide all necessary equipment, including pumps, storage tanks, pipes/taps for distribution, etc., as well as provide technical expertise for planning and logistical management of tanker fleet.

**No. 8 Management of Airhead**

- Requirements:
  - Ground handling team w/equipment
  - Temporary storage facilities
  - Communications equipment
- Provide all necessary personnel and vehicle/equipment support.<sup>30</sup>

The Department of Defense (DOD) communicated its perception of the military's role in the U.S. effort in a series of specified tasks to selected unified commands. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), acting for the NCA, issued an execute order by electronic message a few hours after the DOS cable. This classified message directed USEUCOM to conduct operations in support of the UNHCR. The U.S. European Command articulated its mission in terms of tasks on July 26th and again on the 27th.<sup>31</sup> These tasks reflected the UNHCR request. The locations were more detailed than those contained in the UNHCR communique, while the descriptions of the required actions were less specific:

- [Provide] Immediate assistance to ongoing or planned efforts for the establishment and operation of water distribution and purification systems.
- Establish an airhead and distribution capability at Entebbe, Uganda. Consider Uvira, Zaire.
- Provide 24 hour airfield support services as required at Goma, Bukavu, and other airfields as the situation unfolds.
- Establish overall management of logistics for humanitarian relief efforts in support of UNHCR and other nations.
- Protect the force.<sup>32</sup>

This mission statement may differ from the tasks outlined by the CJCS execute order and the planning order that preceded it.<sup>33</sup> However, there should be a close correlation between the two because the CINC's mission restated his most critical specified and implied tasks.

### **U.S. European Command Planning**

The USEUCOM crisis action planning process produced request - support mismatches. This process, which began in mid-July as refugees poured into Zaire, led to deployment of an assessment team on July 20th. It also produced a concept of operations two days after receipt of the CJCS execute order. The European Command Operations Order (OPORD) 001, published on July 24th, differed significantly from both the UNHCR request of July 19th and the first four tasks included in USEUCOM's eventual

mission statement. The description of the concept of operation included these "lines of operation:"

- First, stabilize the situation in Goma, Zaire...Stop the dying.
- Second, conduct operations with an end to moving the refugees back toward Rwanda.
- Third, your operations must focus on stabilizing the refugee situation in Rwanda to preclude recurrence of a similar crisis.
- Fourth, turn the control and operation of the RCA over to the UNHCR.<sup>34</sup>

The concept also reshaped one of the tasks received from the execute order and deleted another. This excerpt identifies tasks EUCOM specified to the JTF:

- [Perform] In conjunction with UNHCR and other participating third countries and international humanitarian relief organizations, operations to establish and conduct:
  - **Water purification and distribution** in the RCA.
  - Airdrop/airland of humanitarian supplies in the RCA.
  - **A logistics airhead operation at Entebbe** to facilitate the arrival, storage, and distribution of humanitarian supplies.
  - Liaison as necessary with UNHCR, third country officials, and the various international relief agencies.
  - Operations to create the capability to **conduct continuous operations in support of the airlift of humanitarian supplies at Goma** and other designated airfields.
  - Operations to protect U.S. forces and sensitive resources.<sup>35</sup>

The highlighted portions identify tasks related to the original UNHCR request. The original requirement to purify and distribute water in the Goma area lost its detail. The requirement to provide logistics base services no longer existed. At the same time, the order eliminated the USEUCOM task to "provide logistics management capability" for the UNHCR and the NGOs.

The European Command also added tasks to the mission increasing its scope significantly. These tasks followed those listed above:

- Determine requirements for providing additional, immediate assistance ... Plans for long-term U.S. operations should not be limited to the locations mentioned previously.
- Develop a comprehensive plan for transitioning from the currently air-based relief effort to a longer term strategy based on use of land-based vehicle distribution.
- Be prepared to facilitate and accept offload of MPS[maritime prepositioning ships]/prepo from Mombasa; transport equipment to designated sites within the RCA.<sup>36</sup>

This portion of the OPORD told the JTF to determine what needed to be done, to expect to stay for an extended period, and to consider the UNHCR requirement as merely a starting point. It also broadened the mission to include opening a ground line of resupply

from Mombasa. The off-loading of war reserves from Diego Garcia would provide trucks and engineer equipment, if required.

The European Command also instructed the JTF to move the refugees back to Rwanda. The concept envisioned establishing way-stations as a means to draw the refugees home and to support their movement. Civil affairs and PSYOP elements would assist in the coordination and movement of refugees and in convincing them it was safe to return to Rwanda. The JTF would also stabilize the refugee situation and conditions in Rwanda to prevent a similar crisis in the future.<sup>37</sup>

### **Joint Task Force Planning**

The JTF staff followed the azimuth set by EUCOM during the early stages of the operation. Late in the day on the 25th, the staff produced an initial draft operations order titled, "OPORD 94-002: JTF Rwanda Relief Operations."<sup>38</sup> The staff's name for the JTF provided insight into the focus of the effort. The JTF staff oriented on the task of returning the refugees to Rwanda. The assumptions contained in the order gave the first hint of this:

- The Government of Rwanda has granted permission to establish the JTF HQ and major logistical site (intermediate staging base) at Kigali.
- The DOS has approved and the NCA has directed a nation building program for the country of Rwanda.<sup>39</sup>

The concept made it even clearer. The intent of the operation described stopping the dying by producing water, as an initial effort. The JTF would conduct simultaneous operations to ensure regional stability. Discussions of success included the phrase, "Ultimately, the refugees must return safely to their homes in Rwanda."<sup>40</sup> Saving lives in Goma was no longer an end in itself.

The list of forces planned for the operation revealed the potential scope of the new mission. The force structure purposed to the Brigadier General Nix on 25 July far ex-

ceeded that necessary to accomplish the UNHCR requests. However, it did reflect the tasks USEUCOM specified for the JTF. It included:

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| - 2 infantry battalions                     | - 1 transportation battalion headquarters               |
| - 1 2/3 military police battalions          | with movement control teams                             |
| - 2 special forces battalions               | - 1 medical company                                     |
| - 4 aviation lift companies (2 medium lift) | - 2 hospitals   |
| - 1 support battalion                       | - 1 medical group headquarters                          |
| - a large number of ROWPUs                  | - 1 engineer group headquarters                         |
| - 1 terminal service company                | - 2 combat engineer battalions                          |
| - 3 medium truck companies                  | - 1 Navy mobile construction battalion                  |
| - 1 petroleum company                       | - 4 Air Force Prime Beef support teams                  |
| - 1 air drop supply company                 | - 1 Red Horse squadron                                  |
| - 1 transportation cargo company            | - numerous other smaller pieces (civil affairs          |
| - 1 ordnance company                        | teams, PSYOP elements, maintenance                      |
|   | companies, trailer transfer teams, etc.). <sup>41</sup> |

The JTF did not publish OPORD 94-002, but used it as the basis for a draft campaign plan and the JTF SUPPORT HOPE Operational Concept. Published July 26th, the concept contained five phases developed from the lines of operation articulated by the USEUCOM order: stop the dying; return of refugees to Rwanda; support stability; turnover to UN agencies; and redeployment. In the operational concept, as in OPORD 94-002, Kigali became the center of gravity after the situation stabilized in Goma.<sup>42</sup>

General Nix carried a correct focus into the RCA when he deployed on the evening of the 25th. He considered the immediate suffering of the refugees as the enemy.<sup>43</sup> The USEUCOM order directed him to establish the forward echelon of the JTF headquarters in the RCA, to link with appropriate agencies, to assume command of the U.S. military forces in the region, and to begin expanding the U.S. operations in areas where the most lives could be saved.<sup>44</sup> General Nix also wanted to determine exactly what the UNHCR needed. He believed a personal reconnaissance and a face-to-face meeting with UNHCR representatives in Goma would provide specific details of his mission.<sup>45</sup>

Deployment to the RCA gave the JTF leadership insight into the UNHCR requests. General Nix and his small staff arrived in Entebbe on the 26th, where he met with the U.S. Ambassador to Uganda. The Ambassador convinced him that movement of his

headquarters into Zaire might cause the French to pull their support and return to France earlier than expected. Everyone wanted to avoid this. General Nix traveled to Goma on the 27th to observe the U.S. water production operation, which purified its first water on the 26th. Furthermore, he wanted to coordinate with the UNHCR and the French. The UNHCR was standing up its headquarters and could not identify specific support requirements. The clearest example of this came in the area of water management. Representatives of the UNHCR did not articulate their need for water distribution capability until July 31st or August 1st, when production began to exceed their ability to distribute water to those who needed it.<sup>46</sup> Unfortunately, the crisis action planning process in Europe obscured the details contained in the original UNHCR request and USEUCOM's mission statement from July 22d until the end of the month.

The senior UNHCR representative in Goma provided clear guidance on one point during the meeting on the 26th and in later discussions. Repatriation of the refugees represented the key long-term task. This requirement echoed in discussions with the French, other relief agencies, and leaders of the U.N. Assistance Mission in Rwanda.<sup>47</sup> This long-term focus reinforced the tasks specified by USEUCOM and fueled JTF interest in conducting operations in Kigali.

The U.S. military's movement to Kigali raised political and diplomatic issues. Deployment into Kigali was an issue as early as July 22nd, the day the President announced the U.S. mission. Initially, members of the Joint Staff intended to keep U.S. military forces outside of Rwanda. The situation there was extremely dangerous. Planners on the Joint Staff did not know how the warring factions would respond to the deployments or if the RPF could guarantee the safety of U.S. forces. Fortunately, the U.S. military could provide the support requested by the UNHCR without entering Rwanda. Nevertheless,



the CJCS execute order did not preclude movement into Rwanda in support of assessments or aid missions.<sup>48</sup>

Members of USEUCOM and the JTF believed they had authorization to go into Rwanda. The question of authority to deploy into Kigali came up as early as the 26th when General Nix arrived in Entebbe.<sup>49</sup> It emerged again on the the 28th as the JTF staff deployed to the RCA. The lead element of the JTF headquarters left Stuttgart late the 27th en route to Kigali. The pilot diverted the flight to Entebbe because the JCS refused to grant authority to land at the Kigali Airport. The JTF received NCA authority to enter the capital on the 29th. A TALCE arrived and opened the airport on the 30th and the Secretary of Defense visited U.S. forces there on the 31st. Secretary Perry also met with Paul Kagame, the New Minister of Defense and Vice President, at the airfield.<sup>50</sup>

The JTF continued to define its mission and develop its operations order along the lines described until early August. Members of the JTF staff in Germany briefed the CINC on the completed OPORD on the 5th. During the briefing, the CINC reworded the JTF mission statement and made it identical to USEUCOM mission.<sup>51</sup> This act aligned it with his perception of JCS directives. The operations order retained the task of repatriating the refugees even though EUCOM and the JTF now recognized that it was beyond the scope of the mission.<sup>52</sup> Some NGOs and members of the U.S. Government expressed concern when the military stopped talking of repatriating the refugees and began to concentrate on completing the original tasks. By the time the JTF recognized its mission and reoriented its activities, it had established expectations it could not meet. Some relief workers characterized its efforts as "mission shrink."<sup>53</sup>

### **Control of Military Operations**

Indirect control of military forces remains a critical issue in a world with few immediate threats to American national security. This issue has dominated civil-military

relations in western culture since European heads of state stopped leading their armies into battle. During the Cold War, the nature of study and debate centered on the prevention of war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and on the prevention of nuclear war. Congress' reorganization of the Defense Department in 1986 transferred greater decentralized decision making authority to the unified CINCs.<sup>54</sup> Today, the risk of a military crisis escalating to war between the U.S. and another major power or to global nuclear war is much diminished. However, the NCA's ability to control this decision making during a crisis represents a compelling issue.

Joseph F. Bouchard provides a strong argument for studying this subject and a familiar model for examining control in this crisis. His reasons for examining the control of military operations include: the danger of an international crisis expanding into war if leaders are unable to control military forces, the fact that control procedures can affect military-to-military interaction in a crisis situation, and the influence control procedures have on conflicts that arise between military and political considerations.<sup>55</sup> He also identifies five instruments of indirect control. They are: "...the alert system, standing orders [standard operating procedures, doctrine, etc.], mission orders, contingency plans, and rules of engagement."<sup>56</sup>

End state also performs a control function and should join Bouchard's list. Leaders define the military conditions necessary to achieve strategic objectives by specifying an end state.<sup>57</sup> This serves as a frame of reference during planning and execution and provides a means to bound subordinate activities. Mission orders, contingency plans, and end state provide the best look at control during this operation.

Decentralized control failed during early phases of Operation SUPPORT HOPE. Its loss degraded the initial effectiveness of USEUCOM and the JTF and created tension between the military and relief agencies. This was more than a loss of communications

between the NCA and subordinate units. The U.S. military employs common cultural bias, doctrine, intent, and contingency planning to overcome loss of communications, other manifestations of friction, chance. Problems in many of these areas combined to cause this failure of accepted control procedures. Some resulted from interaction between DOS and DOD bureaucracies, others from the conditions associated with this crisis. Regardless of their origin, they are not unique to the Rwandan refugee crisis or to Operation SUPPORT HOPE.

Cultural differences between DOS and DOD representatives affected the NCA's use of mission orders, a key element of decentralized control. The inter-agency planning group experienced difficulty determining the scope of the U.S. response and responsibilities internal to the U.S. Government. All members agreed that the U.S. should participate in four packages, but the group was not sure how great a role the U.S. should play. Additionally, the military possessed the leadership and resources to provide the support, but there were different perceptions concerning the military's mission.<sup>58</sup> Furthermore, while DOS was only the messenger, its cable described the U.S. Government's offer of assistance. Its loose terminology (the U.S. was "...prepared to take the lead role...") produced questions. Would the U.S. lead in organizing an international response, lead in managing efforts on the ground, lead in production and distribution by providing the majority of troops and equipment, or lead through a combination of all of these? The DOS cable left the issue open and allowed the recipients to imagine the role they wanted the U.S. to play.

Cultural differences between DOS and DOD also influenced the information available to the JTF staff as it formulated the UNHCR support mission. The CJCS communicated a statement of the mission to USEUCOM and to supporting unified commands. This version included more detail than the DOS cable about where to provide support,

but reflected the lack of agreement concerning the extent of DOD's role. The military assumed fog and friction would affect the operation and expected that the CINC would determine the specifics of the mission. Military doctrine supported this approach. Unfortunately, the non-military members of the planning group did not expect each level of command to rewrite its mission. If DOS representatives had understood this, the cable may have told the UNHCR and others to meet the CINC's representatives in Goma immediately to outline support requirements. These cultural differences contributed to the military's misunderstanding of its mission. They also helped create friction between the military and the agencies it supported as the JTF redefined its mission in early August.

The NCA gave USEUCOM an unbounded mission when it failed to communicate a strategic end state for the operation, a second method of decentralized control. Joint military doctrine expects the NCA to provide the CINC a desired strategic end state - the set of required conditions that achieve the strategic objectives for the region. It also expects the NCA to provide the CINC missions consistent with the end state. The CINC examines the current situation and designs "...a series of related joint major operations that arrange tactical, operational, and strategic actions to accomplish..."<sup>59</sup> the objectives specified by the NCA. Neither the planning order or the execute order included a description of an end state for the operation. This did not represent an omission on the Joint Staff's part. The doctrinal reference for crisis action planning did not address end states.<sup>60</sup>

The CINC and his staff did what Major General Arnold did in Somalia in 1993 when he received a mission without an end state, they proposed one for CJCS and NCA approval.<sup>61</sup> Repatriation of the refugees seemed the only logical end state in this case. The USEUCOM and JTF staffs presented this to the JCS while continuing to plan and execute the operation. Unfortunately, the pace of activities caused the JTF to focus on

returning the refugees to Rwanda for at least a week before leaders detected the error and provided additional guidance.

Neither the JCS nor USEUCOM possessed a contingency plan appropriate for this operation. The absence of this third element of decentralized control combined with the lack of an end state to complete the break between the theater strategy and national objectives. The U.S. European Command did not have a contingency plan to provide support to the UNHCR in Zaire as the NCA intended. However, it possessed an existing model for dealing with refugees.

The plan that emerged on July 24th resembled an earlier USEUCOM operation. The U.S. European Command initiated Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in April 1990 to provide humanitarian support to Kurdish refugees on the Iraq-Turkey border. Key elements of this operation's concept matched those in Operation SUPPORT HOPE. The CINC's priorities in 1990 were to *stop the dying* and end the refugee misery, relocate the refugees where they could be sustained, and then turn the mission over to the UNHCR or a similar agency as soon as possible. The second task expanded to "Return the population to their homes."<sup>62</sup> When asked to perform four specific tasks outside the country of Rwanda in 1994, the military tried to "refight" a previous humanitarian relief operation. In less than a week, the mission changed enough to be almost indistinguishable from the UNHCR request. It expanded from providing water, airfield operation, airhead operation, and logistics services in Zaire to establishing a 950+ mile, eight day land resupply route and operations in Rwanda to return the refugees to their homes. Planners also dropped the requirement to provide logistics services essential to relief agency operations.

Four additional factors influenced USEUCOM's analysis of the mission and its development of tasks for the JTF. First, EUCOM already managed U.S. operations in

Turkey and Northern Iraq (PROVIDE COMFORT II), U.S. participation in NATO actions over Bosnia-Herzegovina (DENY FLIGHT), U.S. support of U.N. peacekeepers in Croatia and Bosnia, and U.S. peacekeeping operations in Macedonia (ABLE SENTRY).<sup>63</sup> Second, the on-going situation throughout the former Yugoslavia received attention from the USEUCOM staff. Third, tremendous urgency sprang from the magnitude, horror, and visibility of the crisis. This compressed the normal planning cycle. Last, the USEUCOM staff directed current operations for SUPPORT HOPE until the JTF staff was prepared to assume the mission. These factors limited the USEUCOM staff's ability to concentrate on planning.

### **Insights**

The first insights from this operation relate to DOS and DOD cultures and their impact on inter-agency activities. First, these two departments respond differently to crises like the Rwandan refugee problem. Theater and JTF planners should be aware of this difference and its potential to affect both the operation and the relationship between military and non-military participants in the relief effort. Second, DOS representatives report the NCA's decisions on these matters to the U.N. and the rest of the world. Their interpretation of inter-agency agreements may be ambiguous and may create expectations the military is unable or unwilling to satisfy. Organizations and governments with these expectations may exert tremendous pressure on participants in the operation. Third, the military supports civilian control of the armed forces, but cherishes its freedom of action when assigned a mission. Decentralized control is not only critical to effective NCA management of complex operations worldwide, it is essential to the U.S. military's wartime doctrine and to the culture associated with its profession. Decentralized control and mission type orders apply best in conflicts where the situation is unclear and where operational considerations outweigh political concerns. However, the military applies

this doctrine to all operations. It includes the authority to define one's own mission based not only on tasks from above, but also on perceptions of the end state and the situation. In Operation SUPPORT HOPE three headquarters redefined the mission until it no longer met UNHCR requests for assistance or national goals.

Consideration of the tempo of activities involved in the U.S. response identifies a related issue concerning decentralized planning. The NCA must provide effective end states for the theater commander and his staff. The CINC and his staff will develop proposed end states and offer them to the NCA if they perceive that guidance from Washington contains insufficient detail or if they believe it is inconsistent with the situation. The magnitude of the crisis in Goma and the needs of the refugees compressed the planning cycle to the point where USEUCOM and the JTF conducted operations before the JCS reviewed their plan and its end state.

There is another issue concerning end states. The Joint Staff should update its crisis action planning procedures to reflect the conditions under which the U.S. executes its power projection strategy. Cold War planners understood their end state, which never changed. All levels of command recognized the necessity "...to control escalation of a conflict by deterring Soviet intervention and escalatory actions by other participants."<sup>64</sup> The end state equaled status quo, no U.S. - Soviet confrontation. The situation in 1994 lacked the simplicity of the Cold War era. The instructions and tasks contained in the planning order and the execution order failed to provide the CINC the information he required to develop an appropriate vision for this operation. Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, dated 9 September 1993, states the "The desired end state should be clearly described by the NCA before US Armed Forces are committed to action."<sup>65</sup> Unfortunately, Joint Pub 5-03.1, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures)*, dated 4 August 1993, contains no reference to this

version of Joint Pub 3-0 and its discussion of end states, which post date it.<sup>66</sup> Consequently, crisis action planning procedures, examples of the CJCS check lists, and critical orders omit this important subject.<sup>67</sup>

The next insight concerns politico-military and diplomatic aspects of joint operations. The CINC and the JTF Commander require timely and sound politico-military (pol-mil) and diplomatic advice for decentralized control to be effective in crises. The CINC and his staff assess continuously the political consequences of operations in the theater. The Plans and Policy Directorate and pol-mil advisors perform this function for CINCs and JTF commanders. This capability receives limited attention in operations like SUPPORT HOPE with immediate and extensive requirements, with high operational tempos, and when the JTF staff possesses limited policy experience. Future events will decide if recognizing the Tutsi dominated government in July 1994 supported the long-term goals and interests of the United States. There was some question at the time as to what the new government would do when the Hutu returned and what responsibility the U.S. might bear if activities in Kigali and elsewhere in Rwanda coaxed the refugees home to be massacred by a Tutsi dominated government seeking revenge.<sup>68</sup> The military's plan to repatriate the refugees and the associated need to establish a major operation in Kigali may have accelerated the process of recognition without sufficient assessment of potential consequences.

Use of the support package concept provides additional insights. This system works only if all parties are involved in the process. The concept may eliminate confusion if the CINC's staff participates in package definition or the UNHCR provides package descriptions to the CINC and the JTF Commander at the beginning of the operation. The UNHCR developed packages to support the Rwandan refugee crisis of July 1994. The eight packages identified specific U.N. and NGO requirements in Goma, Zaire. The



U.S. military endorsed this approach after the operation because it communicated a clear need, one that also had limits. However, planners should expect similar problems in the future if theater military planners are unaware that packages exist.

Identification of a standard set of packages would reduce potential friction and uncertainty. International responses to natural disasters always focus on providing support for the indigenous population. Operations in support of other nations in the last four years include SUPPORT HOPE, PROVIDE PROMISE in Bosnia (July 1992), RESTORE HOPE in Somalia (December 1992-May 1993), PROVIDE HOPE in the former Soviet Union (February 1992), SEA ANGLE in Bangladesh (May 1991), and PROVIDE COMFORT I and II (April 1991 to the present). Those in the United States and its territories include PROVIDE REFUGE in the Marshall Islands (January 1993), TYPHOON INIKI in Hawaii (September-October 1992), TYPHOON OMAR in Guam (August-September 1992), HURRICANE ANDREW in Florida and Louisiana (August-September 1992), and GTMO in Cuba (October 1991).<sup>69</sup> The victims of disasters or civil unrest in these operations needed water, food, medical care, shelter, and/or security. Planners should expect similar conditions and the need for infrastructure support in the future. Combined DOD, DOS, USAID, and UNHCR planning could create and document standard modules that could serve as building blocks for future deployments.

Identification of a discrete set of support packages would eliminate much of the CINC's freedom of action in a crisis like this. There is a bounded set of modules that are suitable for requirement definition, U.N. requests, interagency coordination, crisis action planning, and situation assessment. Planners would reduce potential confusion if combined military-U.N. assessment teams reported support requirements to their agencies using a common list of support modules, e.g.: ROWPU-150,000 gallons per day or light truck platoon capable of transporting "x" tons of supplies "y" kilometers per day. How-

ever, this approach would place greater detail in the tasks assigned to the CINC than doctrine envisions in mission orders. Consequently, NCA control would be more centralized unless the CINC and his staff participated in the assessment and formulation of the U.S. Government's response to the crisis.

### **JOINT TASK FORCE ACTIVATION**

The creation of joint task forces also contains lessons for the joint planner. This contentious topic represents a key piece of the on-going shift of power between the services and the unified combatant commands. Generally, service and combatant command issues concern methods of creating and supporting JTFs. The special operations community has offered to establish two JTFs capable of deploying world-wide to support unified CINCs, emphasizing its experience in dealing with civil affairs, foreign armies, NGOs, and other organizations considered "unfamiliar forces" to conventional units. Critical North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) issues include combined joint task forces (CJTFs) capable of operations outside of NATO's AOR. Member nations are examining the composition, command and control, training, support, and missions of CJTFs. The Department of the Army is exploring the possibility of transforming 3d Army into a deployable headquarters capable of functioning as a joint force land component command or as a JTF in any theater. This headquarters may provide the basis for a future deployable JTF or CJTF. Service responsibility for JTF training also symbolizes a key issue, as does the Commission on Roles and Missions' consideration of options for JTF establishment. Most of these issues involve force structure initiatives and therefore generate vigorous debate.<sup>70</sup>

A second set of issues concern more pragmatic topics dealing with the performance of the JTF. They include lessons concerning the time required for a JTF staff to "spin

up” and become a cohesive organization or the relationship of a JTF to the unified command. This group of lessons also includes identification of JTF command and control functions, the role of the JTF, and whether Army corps can perform JTF missions. The Battle Command Training Program’s role in training Army JTF headquarters represents a recent addition to this set of issues.<sup>71</sup>

The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 also impacts on the formation of JTFs. Working in the mid-1980s, the authors may not have imagined the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the related change in U.S. military strategy, and the increased importance of JTFs. Regardless, they “...understood that the effective planning, command, and conduct of multiservice military operations require detailed and continuous direction and supervision of a stable set of assigned forces by the unified CINC.”<sup>72</sup> They also intended to provide the joint commander well educated joint service officers.<sup>73</sup> Unstable international conditions and emergency requirements for JTF employment make these goals difficult to achieve. The issues identified in the two preceding paragraphs highlight the lack of maturity contained in U.S. JTF doctrine and procedures. They may also underscore a requirement for joint commands integrated at lower levels in peacetime.

This section examines how the U.S. European Command organized the JTF SUPPORT HOPE staff and how it evolved during the first days of the operation. The goal is to identify insights relevant to the formation of JTFs world-wide.

#### **Activation of JTF SUPPORT HOPE**

Joint doctrine leaves organization of the JTF headquarters to the CINCs. Two of the unified commands, USACOM and USPACOM, employ similar procedures. Both form a JTF based on headquarters subordinate to their components, such as corps or marine expeditionary force headquarters. These theater commands also field a deploy-

able augmentation package or cell to provide the commander joint expertise and linkage to the unified command.<sup>74</sup> Conversely, the U.S. European Command creates a headquarters tailored specifically for the mission. The service component that provides the majority of the forces also provides the largest share of the JTF staff. Other components provide necessary experts to round out the staff, while USEUCOM provides an augmentation cell similar to those discussed earlier. Procedures do not preclude USEUCOM from structuring a JTF around a major headquarters like a corps.<sup>75</sup>

The U.S. European Command deviated from its established procedures during SUPPORT HOPE. Brigadier General Nix's SETAF staff provided a small cell as the nucleus of the JTF staff and supporting headquarters company. This differed from forming a headquarters around V Corps' staff or its Tactical Command Post. The Southern European Task Force lacked the facilities, equipment, and personnel necessary to operate a large JTF. Consequently, it represented only a portion of the personnel and equipment USAREUR provided the JTF. This followed USEUCOM directives. Nevertheless, the unified command failed to provide an augmentation cell to the JTF commander. Selected USEUCOM staff officers joined the JTF staff, but not in the numbers, or with the experience necessary to make the JTF a true joint headquarters.<sup>76</sup>

The JTF staff accomplished its mission in spite of organizational problems and shortages of critical equipment. Conditions associated with the crisis forced the JTF staff to operate as a "pick-up team." The reader should not interpret this as a criticism of leaders or members of the staff. Each individual demonstrated exceptional professionalism, but almost everyone filled an unfamiliar position and few staff members had ever worked together. The new team required two to three weeks of on-the-job training to understand fully the JTF Commander's decision making style and how best to support him. They had to learn the strengths, weaknesses, and personalities of fellow staff members.

They also had to acquire the equipment required for the operation and to learn the staff actions and procedures necessary to exercise control over JTF elements.<sup>77</sup>

### **Evolution of the JTF Staff**

The early evolution of this organization deserves consideration. Many factors combined to shape the JTF staff's performance. The greatest impact resulted from its original preparation and its continual reorganization during the first week of the operation. General Nix, the initial JTF commander, received a call from the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Europe (General Maddox) the evening of Wednesday, July 20th (the day of the CJCS planning order). The two leaders discussed the feasibility of SETAF forming a JTF to support humanitarian assistance operations. General Maddox instructed him to come to Germany the next day to discuss the matter. General Nix traveled to Germany on the 21st and met with his commander. Later that day he returned to Italy and began informal mission analysis with his principal advisors. The USEUCOM Chief of Staff called that evening and told him that no details would be available until Friday morning at 0800, but that he should plan to have his staff in Stuttgart (the location of the USEUCOM Headquarters) Sunday night, July 24th. General Nix instructed his subordinates to plan to arrive in Germany a day early, on Saturday. The next morning at 0800, he received instructions to have his team in Stuttgart that evening. He and 35 members of his headquarters flew to Germany Friday and began to organize the JTF. That afternoon he received word that he would brief his plan to the CINC Wednesday and should expect to deploy the following Friday, the 31st. Later that day, the President announced the creation of the JTF commanded by General Nix. Saturday, he met with the SECDEF in Brussels and continued planning. Sunday, General Nix received instructions to deploy Monday evening. He and approximately 17 members of his staff flew to Entebbe on the 25th.<sup>78</sup>

This headlong rush represented only one dimension of the environment the new organization experienced. General Nix took primarily operators with him on the 25th to form the JTF (Forward), a function performed by the USEUCOM assessment team until his arrival in the RCA. The other members of his staff, mainly intelligence officers and logisticians, remained in Stuttgart to form the basis of the J2 and J4 Directorates. Individuals from headquarters across Europe and from as far away as the United States provided the remainder of the staff. The U.S. European Command provided the Chief of Staff according to USEUCOM policy. Unfortunately, he had joined the USEUCOM J5 Directorate just a week earlier. By mid-day on the 25th, the Chief had names for only 86 of the 225 of the authorized positions for the JTF staff and headquarters. The individuals to fill these billets arrived by the hour throughout Monday and the days following, processed into the headquarters company, and prepared for overseas movement if they were identified to deploy.<sup>79</sup>

The organization of the staff evolved during the first few days of the operation. The evolution included more than the normal dynamics experienced by organizations during formation. Three aspects influence this discussion. First, Lieutenant General Daniel R. Schroeder, the Deputy Commander of U.S. Army forces stationed in Europe, took command of the JTF on the 25th. The staff refocused itself to orient him on the operation and to support his decision making. Second, his arrival and the departure of General Nix created a requirement for two headquarters. The process of pushing out the forward headquarters represents a complex task for any command. The task becomes exceptionally difficult for or an immature organization with insufficient personnel and equipment. Third, conditions in theater and the JTF's lack of deployable facilities forced General Schroeder to keep his personnel and equipment "footprint" small. Consequently, he deployed to Entebbe on the 27th with a small staff group. He left his J3, J4, and J5

and significant portions of their directorates in Stuttgart as part of a split-based command and control arrangement. They became the JTF Rear Headquarters, while the small team with General Schroeder became the primary JTF staff.<sup>80</sup>

With few exceptions, the staff possessed only the equipment individual members brought with them. It lacked almost everything required for operation. The most notable shortages included computers, printers, fax machines, and secure telephones. The new organization also lacked doctrinal and theater publications. The facilities set aside for it in Stuttgart contained only non-secure telephones, desks, chairs, and a copier.<sup>81</sup>

### **Application of the Goldwater-Nichols Act**

Operation SUPPORT HOPE raises questions about the application of the Goldwater-Nichols Act to JTF operations. Lieutenant General John H. Cushman (Ret.) offered a pertinent view of the intent of the legislation in his assessment of DOD's implementation of Goldwater-Nichols. His description of the U.S. Central Command's challenge in the late 1980s may describe how the legislators would view joint operations today:

...this all-service U.S. force must perform superbly from its first introduction into combat. If it is to succeed, it must be well organized, led, trained, and conditioned. Its command and control systems must be tested and in full working order. The force must be prepared to hit the ground running; it would have no time for on-the-job training.<sup>82</sup>

His interpretation of the framers intent for the combatant command provides insight into possible expectations for JTFs in the post Cold War world:

The framers of Goldwater-Nichols understood that the effective planning, command, and conduct of multiservice military operations require detailed and continuous direction and supervision of a stable set of assigned forces by the unified CINC. The lawmakers concluded that true multiservice readiness simply cannot be achieved by occasional exercises and "cooperation with one's putative operational subordinates who look to the service chain of command for most of their direction."<sup>83</sup>

The actual words used in the legislation have more meaning in light of General Cushman's interpretation:

In enacting this Act, it is the intent of Congress...to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to their commands...[and]...to ensure that the authority of the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of mission assigned to their commands...<sup>84</sup>

The lawmakers worked to reform the military to better meet world-wide security challenges. In 1986 that meant threats posed by the Soviet Union and others who challenged U.S. vital interests. The reform's focus on joint operations remains critical five years after the fall of the Soviet Union. The lawmakers desired operations conducted by joint, not component, commands and they sought superior performance at the start of the operation.

The reformers also considered the preparation of individual staff officers. They demonstrated their intent to provide officers experienced in joint operations capable of assisting the CINC in conducting effective multi-service operations. Today, one must extend this aspect of the lawmakers' purpose to JTF operations.<sup>85</sup> The U.S. European Command failed to achieve the framers intent in this case by organizing the JTF around non-joint speciality officers and operating it without significant augmentation from the combatant command headquarters.

### **Insights**

Fundamental issues concerning the process of organizing JTFs and their relationship to the roles and missions of DOD agencies appear when one sets aside obvious topics like the effectiveness of ad hoc organizations and the advantages of a standing headquarters. These issues fall into three areas: conditions that affect the process of JTF formation, discontinuities between current joint doctrine and the realities present in the world, and the relationship of Goldwater-Nichols to JTF operations.

Discussions involving the appropriate method of forming JTFs must stay focused on the purpose of the organization and the conditions under which it emerges. Joint task



forces are, by definition, responses to crises. The situation is always critical, uncertainty is a constant, vital interests are always at stake, time available for response is always constrained, and the highest levels of government take great interest in the JTF's actions.<sup>86</sup> Unfolding events may not allow time to execute a lengthy process of JTF formation. The United States Army Europe completed final preparations for Exercise ATLANTIC RESOLVE as JTF SUPPORT HOPE conducted operations in central Africa. This post Cold War contingency exercise included at least five days of JTF organization and initial planning, nine additional days of JTF and component planning, and 45 days of deployment to close the force in the theater of operations.<sup>87</sup> This scenario dovetails neatly with USEUCOM procedures for organizing joint task forces: USEUCOM increases its watch state as the crisis develops, USEUCOM forms a planning cell, the planning cell (which is not staffed for 24 hour operations) develops courses of action, selected forces move if required, component planners join the planning cell, the CINC identifies a JTF commander, the JTF commander chooses his principal staff officers, USEUCOM and component headquarters provide augmentation to the JTF staff, and USEUCOM transfers planning and control of on-going operations to the JTF.<sup>88</sup> However, it is possible (maybe probable) that conditions will compress this process to the point where the JTF becomes an ad hoc organization forced to stand up, organize, plan, execute, and deploy in the middle of a crisis. It is also possible that this approach reflects USEUCOM's former role as a key Cold War force provider for NATO and a focus on crises and on-going operations in the former Yugoslavia.

Continuous preparation for worse case contingencies may cause planners to discount the most probable scenarios for employment. The U.S. European Command executed numerous short notice crisis response operations in the last five years. The list of operations includes non-combatant evacuations in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Lebanon, Zaire,

Tajikistan, and Kenya-Brundi (U.S. civilians from Rwanda) and humanitarian assistance operations in Africa, the Middle East, Turkey, the former Yugoslavia, and the Commonwealth of Independent States.<sup>89</sup> At the same time, USEUCOM, its components, and other elements of NATO prepared for larger, more dangerous, and potentially more important operations in Bosnia, Croatia, and other states in that region. Perhaps continuous planning conditions staffs to expect plenty of reaction time before deploying large force packages. It is also possible that continuous planning for worst case threats ties up key staff officers. This may be why USEUCOM did not provide a complete staff augmentation package to the JTF as its directives require.<sup>90</sup> Additionally, the Center for Army Lessons Learned reported that, as of mid-1993 "V Corps capabilities provided decision-makers flexibility for a U.S. unilateral response or as NATO's ready force until the Allied Command, Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), could accept the mission...The ARRC, NATO's rapid reaction force, was activated in October 1992 and was to be fully mission capable in 1995."<sup>91</sup> This may explain why USEUCOM did not choose the V Corps Commander and his staff as the basis for the JTF. Perhaps SUPPORT HOPE represented an economy of force operation executed with a backup team, while potential operations in the former Yugoslavia continued to dominate USEUCOM's attention.

Discontinuities between joint doctrine and "real world" situations produce a related issue. Joint doctrine states that CINCs create JTFs for operations limited in time or scope.<sup>92</sup> Operation PROVIDE COMFORT furnishes a glaring example of a JTF operation without an end. Renamed PROVIDE COMFORT II in July 1991, U.S. activities continue in Turkey and northern Iraq. There is a high likelihood that SUPPORT HOPE would continue to support refugee relief in the RCA if it were run by the U.N. There is no end in sight to the refugee crisis and no strategy to bring it to a close. The UNHCR and NGOs provide continued support for refugees in camps ringing the country, while

UNAMIR continues operations in Rwanda. Theater planners must consider this possibility when organizing JTFs. How long can a unified command afford to commit a corps, numbered air force, fleet, or marine expeditionary force headquarters and forces to U.N. humanitarian relief or peace operations? Commanders will continue to exhibit caution concerning this issue until doctrine and procedures address the relief of committed JTFs.

The JTF lacks the expertise to command multi-service forces effectively without a high density of joint speciality officers in key staff positions. The formation of ad hoc headquarters or commands based on component headquarters without an effective unified command augmentation may violate the intent of Goldwater-Nichols. Commands formed in this manner are not joint unless they have a package of key joint staff officers from the unified command. The lawmakers would not consider a group of officers assembled from the component commands as reasonable example of a joint staff.

## CONCLUSIONS

Operation SUPPORT HOPE provides clear insight into the military's execution of its power projection doctrine. Lieutenant General Schroeder recognized this when he stated the lessons of Operation SUPPORT HOPE would extend well beyond humanitarian relief operations.<sup>93</sup> The conditions of the operation paralleled closely those experienced in combat operations as well as other humanitarian assistance missions. A crisis initiated the action and compressed the time available to react, leaders faced uncertain conditions, political and diplomatic concerns were significant, deployment over extended distances was necessary, and the NCA and CINC identified a requirement for a joint task force to organize and control multi-service operations. There are only a few of these operations every year. Their importance and difficulty demand that we study each one closely. Key insights from this operation concern decentralized control in crisis situa-

tions, politico-military experience of JTF staffs, the influence of preparation for worst case scenarios, consideration of long-term operations, and the impact of the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. The most important insights are identified in this section.

*The JCS should reevaluate procedural methods of decentralized control of military operations in light of existing conditions world-wide.* The growing likelihood of crisis response operations and the uncertain nature of the events call for continued decentralized control of combatant CINCs. However, the speed with which operations unfold and the wide range of possible situations facing the CINC prevent the NCA from communicating Cold War type intent and end state. Each situation possesses a unique set of conditions and desired end states which may change frequently. Crisis action planning procedures must provide NCA the means to articulate intent. They must also provide the CINC and his staff the ability to present their assessment of the mission and their understanding of the intent and the end state in a rapidly unfolding crisis.

*All JTF staffs require experts with pol-mil or diplomatic experience.* Operation SUPPORT HOPE reaffirmed the lesson that JTF operations have pol-mil and diplomatic dimensions. This is assured by the threat to vital interests, the crisis itself, compressed time-lines, high levels of interest, and requirements for multi-national and multi-service operations. The JTF Commander possesses a greater need for this type of advice, with respect to the operation, than the CINC. This is caused by uncertainty and the reduced time available for decision making at the JTF Commander's level. Results from this operation and PROVIDE COMFORT indicate that ad hoc JTFs have a weakness in this area.<sup>94</sup>

*Commanders must evaluate short and long-term aspects of crisis response operations when deciding on a JTF organization.* Humanitarian assistance operations are major crises with international and domestic pressures for rapid response. The inherent conditions may restrict severely time to stand up the JTF headquarters. This consideration argues against the USEUCOM model because it may deploy ad hoc headquarters with insufficient preparation. Conversely, it may not be possible to correct the international or regional conditions that initiated the deployment in a matter of weeks or months. This argues against the USPACOM and USACOM technique of organizing the JTF around a subordinate headquarters. If CINCs commit established headquarters, they must develop procedures ahead of time to replace and redeploy key organizations once operations become routine. The XVIII Airborne Corps' redeployment from Panama and Haiti provides examples of this.

*Long-term preparation for specific threats may limit the military's ability to execute the wide range of missions faced by the combatant CINC.* Extended planning for actions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kuwait, Southwest Asia, and Korea focus planners attention on a narrow range of potential threats and associated missions. The command's ability to react to unexpected crises may be restricted by its preparation for the most dangerous threat in theater. Commanders must consider the likelihood of the worst case threat together with the cost of ineffective performance in the myriad of expected operations when developing peacetime theater campaign plans.

*The spirit of Goldwater-Nichols must extend to JTF operations.* Leaders should continue to implement the requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Conditions in the world changed dramatically in the last nine years. The chances of a CINC or component commander directing theater or regional combat operations has decreased since in 1986. Conversely, the probability increased significantly that the CINC will commit a JTF to a

range of operations from humanitarian assistance to combat. The intent of Goldwater-Nichols requires "joint" JTFs to deal with this likelihood, instead of those created from component pieces without extensive augmentation from the unified command.

*The U.S. military should examine some of its most fundamental procedures for organizing forces.* Goldwater-Nichols assigned all forces to the CINCs and gave them authority to prescribe the chain of command and to organize commands and functions within the unified command.<sup>95</sup> Today, that translates to placing forces under the largest component headquarters available in theater. In Europe, the Army component is larger than a corps; in the Continental U.S. it exceeds multiple corps. The CINC reorganizes forces for the duration of a crisis by creating a JTF and by placing necessary forces under the JTF's operational control. Once the crisis is over, the CINC returns the forces to the service component commands. Perhaps the relationship is backwards. Take the Army for example. It may be easier to train headquarters that operate as part of JTFs routinely to fight with a corps or larger land commands than to train division and corps staffs to operate as part of JTFs in an emergency. If this is true and if units can train core skills in peacetime organizations smaller than corps and divisions, then Goldwater-Nichols challenges the military to organize joint headquarters and joint commands below unified command level on an extended basis. Perhaps organizations like fleet, naval task force, air force, army, and even corps headquarters should exist only as temporary commands, while JTFs and their headquarters operate as standing organizations.

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<sup>2</sup> "Joined in Death," *The Economist*, 9 April 1994, pp. 46-47; "The Flight of a Nation," *The Economist*, 23 July 1994, pp. 37-38; Department of State, U.S., Department of State, U.S. Information Agency, "Updated and Expanded Rwandan Crisis Chronology - August 5, 1994," U.S. Information Agency bulletin published by the U.S. Embassy in Brussels, 8 August 1994, pp. 1-5, Central Africa Collection, Group Rwanda, Automated Historical Archives, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center History Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS. Following references to documents contained in this History Office file will be referenced as "AHOS".

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<sup>8</sup> Randall Fegley, comp., *World Bibliographical Series: Rwanda*, (Oxford, England: Clio Press, Ltd., 1992), p. xix; "Rwanda: Historical Background," *Deadline Data on World Affairs*, (Greenwich, CN: DMS Inc., 30 November 1981), p. 1; Filip Reyntjens, "Rwanda: Recent History," *Africa South of the Sahara*, (London: Europa Publications, 1992), pp. 813-16 as referenced by Steven Metz, *Disaster and Intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa: Learning From Rwanda*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 9 September 1994), p. 3.

<sup>9</sup> Fegley, *World Bibliographical Series: Rwanda*, pp. xxi-xxiii; *Deadline Data on World Affairs*, pp. 1-3; Metz, *Disaster and Intervention*, pp. 3-4.

<sup>10</sup> Fegley, *World Bibliographical Series: Rwanda*, pp. xxiii-xxv; *Deadline Data on World Affairs*, p. 3; Metz, *Disaster and Intervention*, pp. 4-5.

<sup>11</sup> Catharine Watson, *Exile From Rwanda: Background to an Invasion*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1991), pp. 14-15; Fegley, *World Bibliographical Series: Rwanda*, p. xxv; Metz, *Disaster and Intervention*, pp. 6; Catharine Watson, "War and Waiting," *Africa Report*, November-December 1992, p. 53 as referenced by Steven Metz, *Disaster and Intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa: Learning From Rwanda*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 9 September 1994), p. 6.

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<sup>14</sup> Clinton, "Remarks on United States Aid to Rwandan Refugees," pp. 1-2.

<sup>15</sup> Joint Task Force SUPPORT HOPE, "Operation SUPPORT HOPE After Action Report," draft, (Heidelberg, GE: Joint Task Force SUPPORT HOPE, 14 September 1994), first and second pages of chronology, AHOS; Joint Task Force SUPPORT HOPE, *Hotwash With Brigadier General Jack P. Nix, Jr.*, 26 August 1994, AAR-008, AHOS.

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- <sup>58</sup> Interview with Colonel Baltimore.
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<sup>73</sup> Ibid., p. 110.

<sup>74</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *U.S. Atlantic Command Implementation Plan*, (Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman of The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 6 October 1993), p. B-2-B-1; U.S. Pacific Command, *USCINCPAC Instruction 3120.26E, Establishment of Contingency Joint Task Force*, (Camp Smith, HI: Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, January 1993), para. 8b., p. 3.

<sup>75</sup> U.S. European Command, EUCOM Directive 55-11 (ED 55-11), *Operations, Joint Task Force Headquarters Organization and Standing Operating Procedures (JTF HQ SOP)*, Headquarters, U.S. European Command, undated (published October 1994), paras. 2-3, pp. 0-1 through 0-3.

<sup>76</sup> Author's observations and notes.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

<sup>78</sup> *Hotwash*.

<sup>79</sup> Author's observations and notes.

- <sup>80</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>81</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>82</sup> Cushman, "An Assessment of DOD Performance," p. 112.
- <sup>83</sup> Ibid, p. 114.
- <sup>84</sup> *Goldwater-Nichols*, section 3.
- <sup>85</sup> Ibid., chapter 38, sections 661-667.
- <sup>86</sup> Coleman, *Tumbling "Component Walls" in Contingency Operations*, pp. 8-14.
- <sup>87</sup> U.S. Army Europe presentation at the Army Leadership Seminar, 24 August 1994, p. 8.
- <sup>88</sup> Lieutenant General Robert D Chelberg (Ret.), Colonel Jack Ellertson, and Major David H. Shelley, "EUCOM - At the Center of the Vortex," *Field Artillery*, October 1993, pp. 13-14; EUCOM Directive 55-11, pp. 0-1 through 0-3.
- <sup>89</sup> Chelberg, "EUCOM - At the Center of the Vortex," p. 13.
- <sup>90</sup> Ibid., pp. 14-15; ED 55-11, pp. III-1 through III-8 (the earlier version of ED 55-11, which was current during SUPPORT HOPE, also contained the requirement to augment the JTF staff).
- <sup>91</sup> Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Lessons Learned Report - Bosnia Contingency Planning and Training - Operations Other Than War*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, September 1994), p. iii.
- <sup>92</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, (Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 11 August 1994), para. 5a., p. IV-14.
- <sup>93</sup> Author's notes.
- <sup>94</sup> "Activation and Manning of the Task Force Plans and Programs (J-5), Item 61822-02990," *Operation Provide Comfort, Joint Uniform Lessons Learned System (JULLS)*, (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, J7-EAD, September 1993).
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